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Executive Summary 
 
In our study of 43 drugs, prescription drug prices in several wealthy nations (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.) were much lower than in the U.S. on average, well 
below relative per capita GDP.  There was relatively little difference among the five foreign 
nations.  All this is consistent with previous research.  After separating less-unique from more-
unique drugs, however, important new findings emerged.  Relative prices for less-unique drugs, 
which are subject to strong competition, were at about half the U.S. level.  We suggest that this 
reflects the exercise of monopsony power that does not exist in the U.S., where buyers as well as 
sellers compete.  On the other hand, relative prices for highly unique drugs tended to be 
approximately proportional to per capita GDP or higher.  Remarkably, biotech drugs were priced 
at or above U.S. levels in Canada and France. 
  
These results carry uneasy implications for the future of pharmaceutical research.  The 
follow-on drugs that make therapeutic classes competitive also amplify the incentives to conduct 
new R&D within these classes even as R&D incentives for pioneer brands disappear with the 
approach of patent expiration.  Our results suggest that price controls operate to blunt these 
incentives for follow-on drug research, leaving most of the burden to U.S. purchasers.  Because 
these follow-on R&D results are often extremely valuable, the implications merit substantial 
concern. 
  
In contrast, biotech drug prices in foreign nations appear to be above profit-maximizing 
levels, which we suggest is caused by political forces in the U.S., while foreign revenues, as one 
would expect, are very low.  This, too, undermines research incentives, especially for creating 
highly innovative drugs. 
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An Exploratory Analysis of Pharmaceutical Price Disparities and 
Their Implications Among Six Developed Nations 
 
John E. Calfee, Mario Villarreal and Elizabeth DuPré  
 
1. Why International Pharmaceutical Prices Matter 
 
 Pharmaceuticals play a large and increasing role in health care and the prevention of 
illness.  Technological advances have accelerated the pace of basic research and vastly expanded 
the scope of drug development.  While government and non-profit organizations conduct the 
bulk of basic research, for-profit firms discover many potential drugs and almost always conduct 
the extraordinarily expensive clinical trials necessary to eliminate products that are dangerous or 
ineffective and bring successful drugs to market.1  The possibility of making profits from the sale 
of newly approved drugs provides the motivation to invest in drug development.  Those profits 
must, on average, cover development costs plus compensation for the large financial risks 
involved in an enterprise in which the great majority of promising new treatments never reach 
the market. 
 Pharmaceuticals comprise an international market in which technology disperses rapidly 
as nations avail themselves of the health benefits of new drugs.  Developed economies and, to an 
increasing extent, mid-level economies such as Brazil, comprise the primary markets from which 
profits can be made and development costs recouped.  Although the United States is by far the 
largest economy in the world, the ability to realize profits from other wealthy nations forms a 
substantial part of the incentives for drug development.  International pharmaceutical pricing 
therefore plays a crucial role in drug development. 
 Pharmaceutical R&D is lengthy and expensive, consuming an average of approximately 
one billion $US over perhaps ten years of research (DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski 2003).  A 
substantial portion of pharmaceutical costs are sunk costs, i.e., costs that are incurred before a 
new drug enters the market.  Because drug prices are set according to market demand (rather 
                                                          
1 DiMasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) reviewed comprehensive drug development data bases.  They found that 
of the 284 drugs approved in the United States during 1990-1999, government sources accounted for 3.2% and 
academia, 3.5%, with the other 93.3% coming from private industry.  Reichert and Milne (2002) explored in more 
detail the relationships between public and private research, noting among other things the very limited extent to 
which NIH engages in the kinds of clinical trials necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy of new drugs.  A 2001 
NIH report examined the genesis of 47 FDA-approved drugs with at least $500,000 in U.S. sales in 1999, finding 
that only four involved direct or indirect federal patents (NIH 2001). 
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than simply to recover costs, which only occurs on average over time (cf. Danzon 1998, p. 296-
298), successful drugs are priced far above the marginal costs of production and distribution.  
Up-front sunk costs have been estimated to comprise some 70% of pharmaceutical costs, with 
manufacturing and other short-run costs accounting for only about 30% (Danzon 1998, p. 296).  
This provides the opportunity for differential pricing.  Economic theory predicts that profit-
maximizing firms with large sunk costs will charge higher prices in markets with stronger 
demand (i.e., markets with lower price elasticities), an approach that roughly accords with the 
theoretical model of Ramsey pricing (Danzon and Towse 2003; ITA 2004, p. 16; Ramsey 1927). 
 Pharmaceutical prices within the U.S. and among developed nations have therefore 
exhibited substantial variance for identical products (Frank 2001, Danzon and Towse 2003).  We 
would expect national demand to be strongly influenced by per capita income.  In wealthy 
nations, health care spending is a “wealth good,” i.e., a mix of products and services for which 
consumers tend to allocate larger portions of income as wealth increases.  Thus relative wealth 
accounts for a substantial portion of the disparities in health spending among advanced 
economies (Reinhardt, Hussey, and Anderson 2002).  Several analysts have argued that in the 
absence of artificial constraints such as government price controls, patented drugs would tend 
toward prices that are roughly proportional to per capita GDP (Danzon and Towse 2003; ITA 
2004, p. 16).  Another factor may also be important, however.  Some innovative new drugs are 
priced partly according to the savings they offer to health care systems.  For example, a recently 
approved biotechnology drug for treating myelodysplastic syndrome, a rare blood disease, was 
priced at approximately $54,000 annually in the U.S. to reflect the costs of blood transfusions 
and other costly measures that the drug would prevent (Wall Street Journal, December 29, 
2005).  Other new drugs, notably the so-called targeted cancer drugs that attack certain forms of 
cancer cells (such as Herceptin, Gleevec, and Avastin) may tend to be priced to compete with 
existing treatments such as chemotherapy and its associated costs of monitoring and alleviating 
side-effects (cf. New York Times, May 11, 2001, on the initial price for Gleevec).  Such costs are 
usually much lower abroad, often simply because prices of health care inputs are lower (Danzon 
and Furukawa 2003, Exhibit 6; Anderson, et al. 2003).  Thus U.S. prices for drugs that reduce 
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health care costs may seem extraordinarily high in foreign nations where non-pharmaceutical 
costs are lower.2 
 Pricing far above marginal costs also offers the opportunity for individual nations to 
suppress prices through legal controls without endangering supply because manufacturers can 
continue to realize profits at prices that remain substantially above marginal cost even if they are 
lower than what would occur in an uncontrolled private market.  Nations with price controls can 
in theory free-ride on non-price-controlled nations in the sense of providing a disproportionately 
low return to pharmaceutical R&D (Danzon 1998).  There are reasons to suspect this actually 
happens.  Total pharmaceutical manufacturer revenues through retail channels in Germany 
during 2004 were less than 13% of U.S. sales while Germany’s GDP is about 22% that of the 
U.S.3  The prospect of free-riding, with its adverse consequences for future drug development, 
was raised by then-FDA Commissioner Mark McClellan in a widely noted speech (McClellan 
2003).  A recent report by the International Trade Administration, part of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, suggested that international price controls are substantially retarding the 
development of new drugs (ITA 2004). 
 Of special importance are new biotechnology drugs, including monoclonal antibodies 
that can treat previously untreatable forms of cancer while providing novel approaches to 
rheumatoid arthritis, M.S., and other illnesses.  Such drugs (of which dozens are available but 
many more are in development) are both expensive to manufacture and tightly targeted at highly 
specific biological mechanisms.  They are typically less susceptible to competition than 
traditional drugs because they are designed to address situations in which patients have few, if 
any alternatives (although this has been changing as the biotechnology sector continues to grow 
and thus foments competition in more lucrative markets).  Biotechnology drugs could therefore 
prove more resistant than traditional small-molecule drugs to price controls.  
 In this article, we review earlier work on international pharmaceutical prices and then 
bring to bear a data set that permits us to explore questions not previously addressed.  These 
                                                          
2 We do not mean to suggest that reductions in other health care costs are, or should be, the primary factor in setting 
prices.  For example, new drugs may offer benefits to employers (in foregone expenses for lost work time and other 
factors) and to patients (who may suffer less and live longer, quite aside from impact on health care costs). 
3 The IMS Retail Drug Monitor for 2004 reports total German revenues at $25.1 billion vs $174.5 billion in the U.S., 
but neither figure reflects rebates.  As we note below, Germany imposed a 16% rebate for nearly all patented drugs 
purchased through public insurance (which accounts for 90% of the population) during 2004.  As we explained 
earlier, unrecorded U.S. rebates were probably much less than the German rebates.  If we reduce German revenues 
by 10%, they were a little less than 13% of U.S. revenues. 
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include the impact of therapeutic class competition and biotechnology status on price and 
revenue disparities for approximately 43 drugs in six nations:  the U.S., Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, and the U.K. 
 
2. International Price Controls and Their Effects 
 
Price control regimes 
 During the past two decades or so, all advanced economies except the United States have 
implemented comprehensive controls over pharmaceutical prices either directly or, in the case of 
the U.K., indirectly by means of profit ceilings (ITA 2004, appendix C; Danzon and Chao 2000).  
These price control regimes exhibit great variety (Kanavos 2002; ITA 2004, appendix C).  A 
common element has been reference to price ceilings in other nations (sometimes called external 
reference pricing), as in Canada, where most drug prices cannot exceed the median price in 
seven designated nations.  An increasingly common tool is reference to the lowest price within a 
therapeutic class (therapeutic class reference pricing) (Danzon and Ketcham 2004; ITA 2004, 
Appendix C).  If a reference pricing class includes a drug with generic equivalents, so that all 
brands are reimbursed at the rate for the cheapest drug in the class, the effect is to reimburse 
patented drugs at levels far below prices in nations without this form of reference pricing.  
Several nations, including Australia, New Zealand, and the Canadian province of Ontario, have 
used this type of reference pricing (Australian Productivity Commission 2001, p. 26).  Germany 
recently resumed this approach starting with the statin class of cholesterol-reducing drugs 
(Bandow 2005; VFA 2005; U.S.T.R. 2005, p. 11). 
 In some nations, such as France, patients using the higher priced drug must pay the entire 
price and sacrifice government reimbursement altogether.  More typically, as in Germany, 
patients can ask for a higher priced drug and pay only the difference (Bandow 2005, VFA 2005).  
In any case, bans on direct-to-consumer advertising keep manufacturers from communicating 
directly to patients.  Physicians would therefore have to take the time to explain to their patients 
why higher-priced drugs are worth the difference.  There appears to be little evidence that 
physicians do this, nor is there any reason why physicians would be compensated for their time 
in doing so (cf. Danzon and Chao 2000, p. 320).  This is despite the fact that several large 
clinical trials have demonstrated substantial morbidity and mortality differences even in such 
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crowded therapeutic classes as the statin drugs (Topol 2004).  The practical effect, therefore, is 
either that reimbursement rates serve as price ceilings or higher priced drugs suffer extreme 
losses in market shares and revenues.  This is borne out by experience in Germany, where 
therapeutic class reference pricing has been applied to the statin class of cholesterol-reducing 
drugs since Jan. 1, 2005, with drastic effects on brand sales (Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2005).  
German physicians who wish to inform patients of the clinical benefits of more powerful statins 
would have to deal with a government report that essentially dismisses the leading evidence on 
that point (Wess 2005). 
 The variety in price control regimes reflects the fact that no single conceptual foundation 
for price controls has yet to be advanced and carefully explored (Calfee 2001).  For example, 
although Australia and other nations have recently cited cost-effectiveness as a standard for price 
ceilings (ITA 2004, appendix C; Henry, Hill, and Harris 2005), neither the theoretical nor the 
practical relationship between cost-effectiveness and price ceilings has been specified (Calfee 
2001).  What is known is that cost-effectiveness analysis provides a clear path toward price 
negotiations and permits the introduction of other factors such as total costs and the “rule of 
rescue” (i.e., paying more attention to the needs of  patients who are widely identified as 
individuals) (Henry, Hill, and Harris 2005). 
 National price control mechanisms also change frequently.  The ITA report, for example, 
documents substantial changes in price regulations in some nations within just a few years (ITA, 
Appendix C).  Germany is a good example of the fluidity of price controls.  As we describe 
below, in 2003, Germany required a 6% rebate for almost all patented drugs purchased through 
public insurance plans (which cover approximately 90% of the population).  The rebate was 
increased to 16% in 2004 and then reduced back to 6% in January 2005 when a broader 
therapeutic class reference pricing plan was implemented. 
 
International price comparisons 
 In a landmark analysis of prices in the year 1992 (actually, for October 1991 through 
September 1992), Danzon and Chao (2000) found that pharmaceutical prices in large developed 
nations were not consistently lower than those in the U.S., although they did not separate 
patented drug prices from generic drug prices.  An update published in 2003 used 1999 prices.  It 
found Laspeyres price indices for on-patent drugs in Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K. 
6 
 
(after assuming an 8% discount from invoice prices in the U.S.) were 0.64, 0.61, 0.73, and 0.74, 
respectively, i.e., from 26% to 39% lower than in the U.S., although Japan’s prices were 
generally higher (Danzon and Furukawa 2003, exhibit 4).4  The discounts from American prices 
tended to be substantially more than proportional disparities in per capita GDP.  Using different 
methods and a much smaller data set, Anderson, et al. (2004) found similar disparities in 
international prices (also see the comment by Danzon 2004a). 
 In 2004, the International Trade Administration (ITA, part of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (USDHHS 2004) published 
separate analyses of 2003 prices in 9 OECD countries, applying similar methods to those of 
Danzon and her co-authors.  (As in the Danzon, et al. studies, foreign prices were calculated 
from revenue and volume data provided by the market research firm IMSHealth.)   The ITA (p. 
38) reported that pharmaceutical prices in seven advanced nations were between 35 and 48 
percent lower than U.S. prices.5  Again, these relative prices were substantially below relative 
per capita GDP levels (see Table 3).6  Although they began with the same IMS data set, the HHS 
analysts arrived at somewhat different results because they used different criteria in determining 
which drugs to keep in their final data set.  The ITA analysis dropped all drugs facing generic 
competition in the U.S. while the HHS study retained those drugs but used the prices of the 
original branded drugs while ignoring generic prices.  Because manufacturers typically avoid 
reducing branded prices when generics enter the market (Reiffen and Ward 2005), the 
differences between the ITA and HHS results were small (see Table 3). 
 Thus on the whole, research reveals large international price disparities, with average 
prices in large developed nations (except Japan) about 30 to 50 percent lower than American 
prices.  Moreover, these disparities have grown over the past fifteen years and have come to 
substantially exceed disparities in per capita GDP. 
                                                          
4 Price indices necessarily assign weights to the prices of each individual drug in the group of drugs for which an 
index is sought.  Laspeyres price indices weight the various drugs in proportion to U.S. revenues.  Paasche price 
indices, on the other hand, weight the various drugs in proportion to revenues in the relevant foreign nations.  
Obviously, the two indices will usually be different.  When foreign nations use a very different mix of drugs, the two 
indices can diverge to a substantial degree, as we found in some of the results discussed below. 
5 Unless otherwise noted, we generally refer to Laspeyres price indices, which are constructed by weighting each 
drug by U.S. quantities in terms of S.U.’s, or Standard Units, as defined by IMS Health. 
6 The ITA report used per capita GDP measures from the IMF that did not take into account purchasing power 
parity, the most widely accepted measure of comparative GDPs.  The ITA report then compared the IMF per capita 
GDP measures with Fisher price indices rather than Laspeyres indices, as we do.  The Fisher indices are the 
geometric mean of Laspeyres and Paasche indices and thus are higher than Paasche indices and lower than 
Laspeyres indices.  Our Table 3 shows relative per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity. 
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The Effects of price controls 
 A small literature has addressed the impacts of international price controls on 
pharmaceutical industry cash flow, profits, and drug development (Vernon 2005; Giaccotto, 
Santerre, and Vernon, 2003; Santerre and Vernon 2005).  The 2004 ITA report estimates that by 
suppressing prices below natural levels (which are assumed to be proportional to per capita 
GDP), price controls in several advanced economies reduce profits and cash flow sufficiently to 
reduce the introduction of new chemical entities by approximately 2.7 to 4.1 entities per year 
(ITA 2004, p. 31). 
 Danzon, Wang, and Wang (2005) address a different question, the extent to which price 
controls delay the introduction of new drugs into nations with more stringent controls.  They find 
that the combination of external reference pricing and the threat of parallel trade from low-price 
to high-price nations causes pharmaceutical firms to delay or forego the launch of new drugs, 
particularly in countries where controls greatly reduce drug prices. 
 
Are price disparities different for different drug classes? 
 The empirical studies just summarized all report only the differences between average 
prices in the U.S. and average prices in each of several foreign nations.  None of the studies 
examine how price disparities vary across individual drugs or therapeutic classes (including 
classes with recent generic entry), or how price disparities vary between traditional small-
molecule drugs and large-molecule biologicals (most of which involve biotechnology).  
Similarly, analyses of the impact of price controls usually assume that price differentials 
engendered by price ceilings are uniform throughout the patented pharmaceutical market.  
Because the pharmaceutical market is changing rapidly under the impact of generic entry and 
biotechnology, a natural question is whether international price disparities (and their effects) are 
substantially different for different parts of the pharmaceutical market. 
 
3. International Price Disparities:  Basic Results 
 
 We began with the list of the top-selling 55 drugs in the US for 2004 (NDCHealth 2005).  
Four drugs were excluded at the outset:  two narcotic analgesics (because they are controlled 
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substances and thus subject to atypical market forces) and rofecoxib (Vioxx) and valdecoxib 
(Bextra), which are no longer on the market.  We also excluded drugs for which there was 
substantial generic competition in the United States throughout 2004 because our interest is in 
how foreign prices compare with drugs still under patent in the U.S.  Seven drugs were excluded 
on these grounds.7  After taking account of the fact that one drug was marketed under two 
different brands (Procrit and Epogen, for which we combined the data), we were left with the 43 
molecules listed in Appendix 1. 
 We obtained prices and quantities for the 43 drugs in each nation from an IMSHealth 
MIDAS data set.  For each drug, IMS provided a weighted average price per standard unit 
(which is normally the smallest common dosage), including prices from authorized licensees 
where relevant.8  A widely noted problem with IMS price data for the American market is that 
they do not reflect rebates, which are normally not recorded in the invoices from which IMS 
derives its price estimates (see Danzon and Furukawa 2003).  The authors of the HHS report, 
however, had access to Medicaid “best price” data (which are required by law to reflect rebates).  
The authors concluded that at least for non-Medicaid prices, IMS data are quite accurate.9  
Following HHS, and in contrast to earlier work, we also assumed that IMS prices for non-
Medicaid purchasers need not be discounted to provide more accurate data.10 
                                                          
7 We did retain a few drugs for which IMS data included very small sales from sources other than the pioneer firm 
or its licensees.  These drugs obviously did not face significant generic competition. 
8 Our IMS data set consisted of a single weighted price (along with revenues) for each drug in each nation.  Prices 
were per IMS-defined standard unit (S.U.), a widely used measure.  Prices across dosages, pack size, and so on, 
were weighted by volume by IMS.  The ITA and HHS studies, as well as the Danzon studies, used far more 
extensive (and far more expensive) IMS data sets with separate prices and revenues for each pack size, etc.  Thus we 
relied upon IMS’s own weighted averages for each drug in each nation rather than calculating our own.  Danzon’s 
articles in the references section provide some discussion of the potential impact of using less aggregated measures, 
which permit direct comparisons for, e.g., specific dosages. 
9 See the discussion at HHS 2004, p. 70.  HHS used non-public data to adjust prices paid by Medicaid to reflect non-
public rebates.  This discussion noted that for the top-selling drugs in their data set, their analysis indicated that 
“market prices including Medicaid are slightly less than the IMS invoice prices for comparable transactions.”  The 
report noted at p. 115 that for non-Medicaid prices of branded products, “the CMS totals were about one percent 
higher than the IMS totals . . .”  The complicated laws on Medicaid drug prices are described in CBO 2005. 
10 Danzon and Furukawa 2003 (p. 526) used a complicated method to adjust IMS prices for the U.S. to reflect 
unrecorded manufacturer discounts.  Their method resulted in an average discount of eight percent from IMS prices, 
which they note was comparable to contemporary estimates of unrecorded rebates.  We also note that the ITA 
analysis excluded prices paid to Medicaid.  We could not do that because the data set we used simply provided all 
ex-manufacturer prices paid by wholesalers, including ones who in turn sold to Medicaid.  Had our data also 
included rebates paid by manufacturers to Medicaid, they would in effect have included some prices that were 
substantially below private market prices.  But our data excluded rebates paid only to Medicaid.  The net effect is 
that our price data are probably very comparable to the ones ITA relied upon in their analysis. 
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 IMS data also do not reflect rebates in foreign nations.  That has generally not been a 
problem because foreign rebates have been rare.  Germany has become an exception, however.  
In 2004, Germany imposed a 16% rebate for nearly all patented drugs purchased through public 
insurance.11  This was an increase from 6% in 2003.  In January 2005, the rebate was dropped 
back to 6%, partly because of a substantial expansion of therapeutic reference pricing.  These 
rebates are not captured in the IMS data, but in 2004, at least, the rebate was large enough to 
materially affect international comparisons.  In 2001, approximately 90% of German consumers 
received pharmaceuticals through public insurance.12  We assume that the same proportion of 
patented drug revenues was subject to the rebate.  We therefore reduced all prices and revenues 
in Germany by 14.4% (90% of 16%). 
 In calculating price indices, we excluded prices from nations in which a generic was 
available for specific drugs because, again, we are interested in the effects of price controls on 
prices for patented drugs.13 
 With these restrictions and adjustments, we calculated both Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices of relative prices, where the Laspeyres indices were weighted by U.S. volumes, and 
Paasche, by foreign volumes.  The results are presented in Table 1.  Laspeyres indices in 
Australia and Germany (the latter with the 16% rebate in effect) were about 0.52 while those in 
the other three nations clustered around 0.60, i.e., somewhat more than half the U.S. level.  
Paasche indices were substantially lower, reflecting the tendency of foreign nations to consume 
relatively larger quantities of lower-priced brands.14 
 
                                                          
11 U.S.T.R. 2005, p. 11.  The exception was drugs already subject to reference pricing.  We learned from industry 
sources that all of the drugs we examined were in fact subject to the rebate, with the exception of sildenafil (Viagra), 
which was not eligible for reimbursement under the Statutory Health Insurance system. 
12 See Busse 2004, n. 1, who reports 88% for public insurance and 2% for “free governmental health care (for 
example, police officers . . .)”. 
13 So, for example, in calculating price indices, we excluded Zocor prices in Germany, where a generic was 
available, but included Zocor prices in Australia, where no generic was available. 
14 The data set included a very low and apparently anomalous bulk price for rituximab in the U.K.; we deleted that 
component from the U.K. rituximab price. 
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Table 1   
Relative Pharmaceutical Price Indices 
for 43 Drugs in Five Developed Nations (U.S. = 1.00) 
 
 U.S. Australia Canada France Germany U.K. 
Laspeyres 1.00 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.59 
Paasche 1.00 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.50 
 
See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs. 
 
 
 We noted that spontaneous differential pricing could tend to track with relative per capita 
GDP levels.  Table 2 presents relative price indices, relative per capita GDP, and the ratios of the 
first to the second.  Relative prices in all five nations are well below relative GDP levels, with 
Australia at 0.66 of relative per capita GDP and the others concentrated between 0.74 and 0.77.  
We noted earlier, however, that because foreign health care services tend to be priced much 
lower than U.S. levels (even more so than drug prices are, according to Danzon and Furukawa 
2003), manufacturers unconstrained by controls could tend to price below relative per capita 
GDP for drugs that yield cost savings elsewhere in health care systems (because these cost 
offsets would be worth less in foreign nations).  This could account for part of the disparity 
between relative per capita GDP and relative drug prices, but we see little reason to think it 
accounts for the bulk of it.  At any rate, we will see later that price disparities depend strongly on 
what kind of drugs are being compared. 
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Table 2   
Relative per capita GDP and Pharmaceutical 
Price Indices for 43 Drugs in Five Developed Nations 
 
 
 U.S. Australia Canada France Germany U.K. 
per capita GDP ratio to 
U.S. (2004) 
1.00 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.79 
Laspeyres 1.00 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.59 
ratio of Laspeyres to 
relative per capita GDP 
1.00 0.66 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.75 
Paasche 1.00 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.50 
ratio of Paasche to 
relative per capita GDP 
1.00 0.52 0.63 0.57 0.64 0.63 
 
See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs.  Per capita GDP data using PPP comparisons are from the OECD, 
National Accounts of OECD Countries, Main Aggregates, Vol. 1, reported at current prices in U.S. dollars 
based on current purchasing power. 
 
 Table 3 presents our results along with earlier results from Danzon and Furukawa (2003) 
and ITA (2004).  Except for Australia, where our results are 13 percentage points lower, our 
findings are within three to six percentage points of the ITA results for Laspeyres indices, with 
Canada, France, and the U.K. slightly higher (and Germany would have been substantially 
higher without the 16% rebate).  These differences reflect a different mix of drugs (including two 
new biotech drugs), different weights (because of changes in revenues), the use of more 
aggregated IMS data, and the 16% rebate in Germany.15  Note that the large disparity between 
the ITA’s estimated Laspeyres and Paasche indices (0.65 vs 0.38) for Australia indicates that 
Australian usage is unusually sensitive to prices. 
 
                                                          
15 The German rebate was 6% in 2003.  The ITA report does not mention the rebate; we have been informed by 
former ITA staff that the rebate was not taken into account in the ITA’s calculations.  We noted earlier that our IMS 
data set was aggregated to the molecule level for each nation, whereas the ITA and HHS staff acquired far more 
detailed data for each pack size and dosage, from which the staffs calculated weighted price indices.  We also used 
data for 2004 instead of 2003, resulting in a different mix of drugs and different weights for the same drugs.  Four 
drugs on the ITA list are not on ours (fluticason, interferon beta 1A, ribaviron, and rofecoxib), and six were on our 
list but not ITA’s (aripiprazole, cetirizine, darbepoetin alfa, escitalopram oxalate, lamotrigine, and pegfilgrastim). 
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Table 3   
Recent Estimates of Relative Pharmaceutical Price Indices 
for 43 Drugs in Five Developed Nations (U.S. = 1.00) 
 
 Australia Canada France Germany U.K. 
Our results      
relative per capita 
GDP (2004) 
0.79 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.79 
Laspeyres (2004) 0.52 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.59 
ratio of Laspeyres to 
relative p.c. GDP 
0.66 0.77 0.77 0.74 0.75 
Paasche (2004) 0.41 0.50 0.43 0.46 0.50 
ITA (2004)      
relative per capita 
GDP (2003) 
0.80 0.81 0.74 0.72 0.79 
Laspeyres (2003) 0.65 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.53 
ratio of Laspeyres to 
relative p.c. GDP 
0.81 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.67 
Paasche (2003) 0.38 0.51 0.43 0.49 0.43 
HHS (2004)      
Laspeyres (2003) 0.67 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.56 
ratio of Laspeyres to 
relative p.c. GDP 
0.84 0.70 0.72 0.79 0.71 
Danzon and 
Furukawa (2003) 
     
relative per capita 
GDP (1999) 
0.77 0.81 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Laspeyres (1999)  0.64 0.61 0.73 0.74 
ratio of Laspeyres to 
relative p.c. GDP 
 0.79 0.84 1.00 1.01 
 
See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs.  Parentheses indicate the year of the data.  Our results are for year 
2004 prices; ITA (2004) and HHS (2004) are for 2003 prices; Danzon and Furukawa (2003) is for 1999 
prices.  Per capita GDP data using PPP comparisons are from OECD Factbook 2005, reported at current 
prices in U.S. dollars based on current purchasing power. 
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 Danzon and Furukawa (2003)’s analysis of 1999 data yielded consistently higher relative 
prices than in our study and in the ITA report.  Those 1999 relative prices were in turn 
substantially higher than those found by Danzon and Chao (2000) for 1992 prices, which are not 
shown in the table (that estimate included generics, however).  Comparing results for 2003 and 
2004 data with that for 1999 and 1992 data, international pharmaceutical prices have been 
declining relative to U.S. prices and, roughly speaking, have dropped from approximate parity 
with relative per capita GDP in 1999 to levels substantially below relative per capita GDP in 
2003 and 2004. 
 
4. What Influences Price Differentials? 
 
 We explored several factors that could affect the extent to which U.S. and foreign prices 
diverge.  We report here the results of a preliminary analysis including simple cross-tabulations 
and regressions; a subsequent version will include additional econometric results.  One obvious 
question was whether some nations were more stringent than others in their controls over prices.  
We found mixed evidence.  Three nations were clustered within a band of three percentage 
points around a relative price index of 0.60, while Australia and Germany were at approximately 
0.52 (using Laspeyres indices).  When we excluded biotech drugs (as reported below) the range 
was slightly larger, with Australia and France having the lowest non-biotech prices (0.45), 
followed by Germany (0.48), Canada (0.50), and the U.K. (0.54).  In the regression exercise 
reported below, which takes account of the relative uniqueness of drugs and whether a drug is 
classified as biotech, we estimated a model that included dummy variables for each foreign 
nation.  Although the estimated coefficient for Australia was negative (representing a decline of 
four percentage points), its statistical significance was very marginal (p = 0.30).  Coefficients for 
other nations were not close to being significantly different from zero.  In one respect, however, 
national differences were striking.  When we separated drugs according to relative uniqueness, as 
described next, relative prices in Canada and France were well above those in Australia, the 
U.K., and especially Germany.  For biotechnology drugs, the national configuration was similar 
but with even more striking differences in relative prices. 
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Relative uniqueness 
 Another possibility is the influence of therapeutic class competition, i.e., competition 
from drugs employing a biologically similar mechanism within a therapeutic category.  The 
presence of multiple brands within a single class should bolster competitive forces driving prices 
down in the U.S. market while providing foreign price controllers with leverage in setting or 
negotiating price ceilings.  To explore this topic, we classified drugs into three classes of relative 
uniqueness.  For many drugs, this was a relatively straight-forward process, as for example in 
categorizing proton pump inhibitors into the least-unique category.  Other drugs, of course, 
involved judgment.  We classified the three statins in the least unique category, while putting the 
SSRI and SNRI antidepressants in the middle category along with atypical antipsychotics, two 
antibiotics, and several other therapeutic categories including two TNF-inhibitors used to treat 
rheumatoid arthritis (cf. Boston Globe, Oct. 14, 2004, on competition in this category).  All 
biotech drugs fell into the most-unique category. 
 Appendix 1 lists these classes and the drugs that belong to them.  We then calculated 
separate price indices for each degree of uniqueness.  Table 4 presents the results. 
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Table 4 
Relative Price Indices for 43 Drugs 
According to Relative Uniqueness* 
 
 Australia Canada France Germany U.K. 
Least unique      
Laspeyres 0.40 0.52 0.40 0.41 0.45 
Paasche 0.41 0.53 0.38 0.41 0.42 
Moderately unique      
Laspeyres 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.59 
Paasche 0.39 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.56 
Most unique      
Laspeyres 0.75 0.88 0.96 0.65 0.74 
Paasche 0.45 0.62 0.81 0.57 0.60 
relative per capita 
GDP (2004) 
0.79 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.79 
 
* See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs classified by relative uniqueness. 
 
 Relative prices increase as we move from least unique to most unique, especially between 
moderately and most unique, with the sole exception that least-unique prices were somewhat 
higher than moderately unique prices in Canada.  Also, the disparities between Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices increase as we go from the least-unique to the most-unique categories.  This is 
presumably because nations adjust prescribing patterns among drugs in response to relative 
prices across drug categories.  Also notable is that Laspeyres indices are roughly comparable 
with relative per capita GDP except for France, where prices were well above that benchmark.  A 
natural question is why prices of less-unique drugs tend to be lower abroad than in the U.S.  We 
address that question in the discussion section. 
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Biotechnology vs. traditional drugs 
 Biotechnology drug pricing in international markets may work differently from pricing 
for traditional drugs (often referred to as “small molecule” drugs although some biotech drugs 
are small molecules rather than proteins, or large molecules).  For one thing, manufacturing costs 
are typically much higher for biotechnology drugs.  Perhaps more important, however, is the fact 
that many of these drugs ─ most monoclonal antibodies for cancer, for example ─ attack 
conditions that are otherwise nearly impervious to treatment.  These drugs usually have no close 
substitutes.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that some biotech drug manufacturers maintain a single 
world price in developed nations regardless of national price controls (cf. Columbia Business 
School 2002; New Zealand Herald, July 30, 2002).  To explore biotechnology drug pricing in the 
U.S. and foreign markets, we sought to classify the drugs we studied as being biotech or non-
biotech.  Unfortunately, there is no well-accepted definition of a biotechnology drug.  Although 
most biotech drugs are complex proteins ─ “large molecules” instead of “small molecules” ─ not 
all are.  The cancer drug Gleevec is an example of a small-molecule drug (administered in pill 
form) that is indisputably the result of sophisticated biotechnology research methods (New York 
Times, May 8, 2001; Novartis 2001; Stephenson 2001).  We therefore relied upon the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization’s registry of approved biotechnology drugs.  Seven of our 
drugs were classified as biotech; these are indicated with an asterisk in Appendix 1. 
  Table 5 presents relative price indices for biotech and non-biotech drugs.  The differences 
are striking.  The gulf between biotech and non-biotech Laspeyres indices is very large.  Biotech 
drug prices in Canada and France are actually above U.S. levels, and only Germany (at 0.71) is 
below 80% of U.S. levels.  On the whole, the biotech drugs in our sample were priced within ten 
percent or so of U.S. prices and (except Germany, again) were on average priced above relative 
per capita GDP.  On the other hand, non-biotech prices were roughly at 50% of U.S. levels.  In 
other words, relative to U.S. prices, foreign biotech price indices were nearly twice small-
molecule drug price indices.  But that is when we look at Laspeyres indices.  The story for 
Paasche indices is different.  While Paasche non-biotech indices are slightly lower than 
Laspeyres indices, as one would expect, Paasche biotech indices are substantially lower than 
Laspeyres indices, averaging about two-thirds to 70% of U.S. levels (with Australia at 52%).  
This reflects the tendency in some nations to avoid rapid use of newer, more expensive biotech 
drugs, a topic that we take up later. 
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Table 5   
Laspeyres Relative Price Indices for 43 Biotech 
and Non-Biotech Drugs in Five Developed Nations 
 
 Australia Canada France Germany U.K. 
Biotech      
   Laspeyres  0.83 1.04 1.18 0.71 0.80 
   Paasche  0.52 0.67 0.89 0.56 0.68 
Non-biotech      
   Laspeyres  0.45 0.50 0.45 0.48 0.54 
   Paasche  0.40 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.48 
 
See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs. 
 
 
Regression analysis 
 We also employed regression analysis to assess the relative power of the factors just 
outlined.  We did not model the negotiating processes underlying drug prices in either the U.S. or 
in nations with price controls.  We assumed that those processes would support a simple model 
in which for each individual drug, the ratio of each foreign price to the U.S. price could be 
treated as a function of several independent variables.16 
 We constructed a scalar variable called “uniqueness” that took the value of 0, 1, or 2 
according to how each drug was classified.  We also included a biotechnology dummy variable 
that took the value of one for biotechnology drugs and zero otherwise.17 
 Thus our model was: 
                                                          
16 We used the STATA econometric program to employ OLS (ordinary least squares) with robust standard errors.  
Because the dependent variable (the ratio of foreign prices to U.S. prices) is truncated in the sense of not permitting 
negative values, we tested the validity of OLS by using the regression results to predict the values of price ratios.  
No predicted values were negative, indicating that OLS is a satisfactory method.  
17 Recall that we tried entering dummy variables for each nation, but dropped them because none of the coefficients 
were statistically significant and the other results were essentially unchanged. 
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 R = K + βuUniqueness + βbBiotechnology + ɛ 
where 
 R = ratio of foreign to U.S. manufacturer prices for each drug in each foreign nation 
 K = constant 
 
 Uniqueness 
  0 = least unique: very similar to other molecules 
  1 = moderately unique 
  2 = most unique 
 
 Biotechnology = biotechnology drug dummy = 1 for biotechnology drug 
  
 The results are presented in Table 6: 
Table 6  
Determinants of Relative Drug Prices 
for 43 Drugs in Five Nations Compared to U.S. Prices 
 
Variable Coef. Std. Error p-value 
Constant 0.395 0.020 0.00 
Uniqueness 0.127 0.028 0.00 
Biotech 0.203 0.079 0.01 
  
n = 189, r2 = 0.301,  F(2,186) = 27.18 (p = 0.00).  The nations are Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, and the U.K.; see Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs. 
 
 
 Recall that the dependent variable is the ratio of manufacturer prices for each drug in 
each relevant foreign nation to U.S. prices.  The basic statistical measures (r2 and the goodness-
of-fit F statistic) indicate a respectable degree of explanatory power.18  All estimated coefficients 
(including the constant) are highly significant, as is the F statistic (assuming that a coefficient is 
statistically significant if its p-value is 0.05 or less). 
 The results are very suggestive and they largely reinforce the results in the simple tables 
provided above.  The constant term of 0.40 represents relative prices of drugs that are least 
                                                          
18 Because the dependent variable is truncated at a lower bound of zero, we exercised a STATA routine to check for 
negative predicted values (which could cause biased parameter estimates).  No negative predicted values were 
found.  We therefore felt comfortable in using OLS with standardized beta coefficients and robust standard errors. 
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unique (and none of which are biotech drugs).  Drugs that are more unique have significantly and 
substantially higher prices, so that after controlling for biotech status, drugs in the most unique 
category are about 25 percentage points higher than those in the least unique category.19  
Biotechnology status adds another 20 percentage points, suggesting foreign biotech prices are at 
roughly 86% of U.S. prices.  Thus relative biotech drug prices were well above relative per 
capita GDP.  This intriguing observation is taken up in the next section. 
 
 
5. Revenues of Biotech and Non-Biotech Drugs 
 
 Governments in wealthy nations other than the United States are not only would-be price 
controllers in pharmaceutical markets, but they are also the exclusive or dominant payers.  Thus 
governments can control usage even when they cannot control prices.  The fact that foreign 
biotechnology drug prices were roughly at parity with U.S. prices (and well above relative per 
capita GDP ratios) raises the question of how foreign biotech drug usage compares with U.S. 
patterns.  Table 7 presents total revenues by nation for biotechnology and non-biotechnology 
drugs in our sample, along with biotechnology shares of national revenues. 
 These results are of considerable interest.  Recall that relative to the U.S., foreign biotech 
drug prices are much higher than non-biotech prices.  That means that if drug usage patterns in 
the five foreign nations closely tracked those in the U.S., biotech drugs should account for a 
much larger share of foreign revenues than of U.S. revenues.  But we observe the opposite:  
biotech drugs capture only 14% of foreign revenues compared to 17% of U.S. revenues. 
 
                                                          
19 The most-unique category was coded with a uniqueness variable equal to 2, as opposed to 0 for the least-unique 
category.  Hence to calculate the relative prices of the most-unique drugs we add twice the 0.127 coefficient of the 
uniqueness variable, yielding approximately 0.40 plus 2 X 0.13, or 0.66. 
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Table 7  
Foreign vs U.S. Revenues for 
43 Biotechnology and Non-Biotechnology Drugs 
(millions of $US) 
 
 Total 
revenues 
Biotech 
revenues 
Biotech 
share 
Non-Biotech 
revenues 
Non-Biotech 
share 
Australia 1,785 198 0.11 1,587  0.89 
Canada 3,128 409 0.13 2,719  0.87 
France 5,116 856 0.17 4,260  0.83 
Germany 3,178 508 0.16 2,670  0.84 
U.K. 4,040 360 0.09 3,680  0.91 
  Foreign total 17,247 2,331 0.14 14,916  0.86 
U.S. 91,904 15,530 0.17 76,374  0.83 
  Total 109,151 17,861 0.16 91,290  0.84 
Foreign Share 
of revenues 
0.16 0.13  0.16  
 
See Appendix for a list of the 43 drugs.  Some totals may not add up due to rounding error. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
 In our analysis of 43 top-selling drugs in year 2004 in the U.S., Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, and the U.K., relative price indices were similar to those estimated in the ITA 
and HHS studies of top-selling drugs in 2003 even though we used a different mix of drugs and a 
more aggregated data set, and took account of a substantial new rebate in Germany.  We found, 
as did ITA and HHS, that relative prices in these five foreign nations tended to be about 52% to 
62% of U.S. prices.  These ratios were well below relative per capita GDP (75% to 79% of U.S. 
levels), an oft-mentioned benchmark for international drug prices.  In contrast, earlier studies 
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using international price data from 1999 and 1992 found relative prices roughly at parity or 
higher compared to the per capita GDP benchmark. 
 We found only modest differences across non-U.S. nations, with price indices ranging 
from 0.52 for Australia and 0.53 for Germany to 0.61 for Canada.  One striking factor, however, 
was the 16% rebate that Germany imposed during 2004.  It dropped Germany from having the 
highest prices (along with Canada) to nearly the lowest among the five nations.  The 16% rebate 
applied only during 2004 before reverting to 6%, but a more aggressive form of therapeutic 
reference pricing was introduced for 2005.  The prospect of future rebates will surely stiffen the 
negotiating stances of manufacturers of drugs in more-unique (and thus less competitive) classes, 
even as prices in more competitive classes are pushed further down toward the prices of newer 
generics in the same class. 
 
Toward bifurcated international pricing: monopsonies and bilateral monopolies 
 Most of our analysis focused on how price disparities varied across broad categories of 
drugs.  Some findings are striking.  Dividing our sample into three groups of least-unique, 
moderately-unique, and most-unique drugs, relative prices were slightly lower for least-unique 
drugs than for moderately-unique ones (except in Canada), but relative prices for moderately-
unique drugs were far lower than for the most-unique category of drugs.  Comparing non-biotech 
and biotech drugs, price indices for non-biotech drugs were only about 0.50 whereas indices for 
the seven biotech drugs in our sample ranged between 0.69 (in Germany after its 16% rebate) 
and 1.18 (in France).  We also found large disparities between Laspeyres and Paasche indices for 
the most-unique drugs and also for biotech drugs, suggesting substantial adjustments in the mix 
of prescribed drugs in foreign nations faced with large relative price differences across drugs. 
 Examining revenues rather than prices, biotech drugs accounted for only 14% of foreign 
revenues versus 16% of U.S. revenues even though foreign biotech drug prices are relatively 
much higher than non-biotech prices.  The biotech component of revenues was especially low in 
Australia, Canada, and the U.K.  In France and Germany, biotech drugs accounted for essentially 
the same proportion of revenues as in the U.S., but that, too, represents disproportionately slower 
uptake of biotech drugs because relative prices in those nations were substantially higher for 
biotech than for non-biotech drugs.  Foreign shares of total biotech revenues were 
correspondingly low.  In fact, the foreign share was a remarkably low 7% for Procrit and 8% for 
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Neulasta (not shown in the table).  These nations simply did not avail themselves of the biotech 
drugs in our sample to anywhere near the extent that the U.S. did. 
 Why did prices of less-unique drugs tend to be so much lower abroad than in the U.S.?  
We offer some thoughts about the possible impact of several factors.  One is that some of these 
drugs faced more competition abroad from generic versions of older drugs in the same 
therapeutic class.  Statins are an example:  both Zocor (simvastatin) and Pravachol (pravastatin) 
were available in generic form for at least part of the year in Canada, Germany, and the U.K. but 
not in Australia, France, and the U.S.  Although we avoided direct comparisons between prices 
of on-patent drugs in the U.S. and generic versions of the same drug abroad, the presence of a 
generic can strongly affect pricing of other patented drugs in the same class.  But we doubt that 
generic competition alone can explain the low prices for least-unique and moderately-unique 
drugs.  For one thing, many of these drugs faced no more generic competition abroad than in the 
U.S.  Moreover, the U.S. generic market generally features more competition and lower prices 
than in most if not all of the five foreign nations (Danzon and Ketcham 2004).  Nonetheless, the 
differential impact of off-patent drugs in foreign versus U.S. markets appears to be a little 
explored topic (which we could not address because of limitations in our data set). 
 The size of the buyers was certainly irrelevant.  Each of the three largest American 
pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs) negotiate prices for larger volumes of prescription drugs 
than the entire Australian or Canadian health care systems.  A crucial factor, however, is the U.S. 
competitive environment, which is very different from that elsewhere.  Even the largest 
American PBMs must compete among themselves.  A PBM that is unable to reach agreement on 
prices for a popular member of a therapeutic class must take account of the fact that its clients 
(managed care organizations and individual employers, for example) can easily turn to another 
PBM.  No such competition exists in the other nations.  This suggests that a single payer 
arrangement rather than volume is the driving force in price negotiations over drugs facing 
therapeutic competition.  The fact that the small nation of New Zealand is known for its low drug 
prices reinforces this observation. 
 Thus the main factor in lower prices for competitive, non-unique drugs appears to be 
monopsony power (as has been argued by, among others, ITA 2004 and Danzon 2004b).  Central 
governments essentially act as monopsonistic purchasers even when they only set prices for 
purchases by private organizations or provincial governments.  This fact clearly shapes the 
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impact of generic competition within classes.  For example, we noted that Germany sometimes 
links branded drug prices to generic prices in the same therapeutic class.  On the other hand, 
monopsonies are rare in American pharmaceutical markets, restricted to a few federal agencies 
such as the Veterans Administration.  We note, however, that monopsony power does not 
operate alone in foreign nations.  The fact that manufacturers cannot communicate directly to 
patients (and are often greatly restricted when communicating to physicians) is also important.  
The inability to convey significant differences among competing brands has the effect of making 
drugs within a class seem more similar than they really are, thus reinforcing monopsony power. 
 In contrast, highly unique drugs, a category that includes most biotech drugs (so far, at 
least), are marketed in situations that approximate a bilateral monopoly, i.e., a single buyer and a 
single seller.  This appears to explain why foreign prices of highly unique drugs are so much 
higher than those of less-unique drugs relative to U.S. prices.  For the most-unique drugs, 
monopsony power is arrayed against monopoly power, leaving little if any role for price controls 
in the usual sense. 
 What happens when two biotechnology drugs actually compete rather closely?  Our data 
show that the two TNF-inhibitors (for rheumatoid arthritis) tend to have higher prices abroad 
than in the U.S.  Whether price competition in the U.S. will be sharper than in foreign nations as 
other biotechnology drugs begin to face competition (as most of them surely will; see Flanagan 
2006) remains to be seen. 
 
Lower prices, higher profits? 
 In some nations, biotech drug prices were probably well above the levels that would 
maximize profits.  We noted earlier that on average, profit-maximizing prices for biotech and 
other highly unique drugs would probably be a little less than proportional to per capita GDP 
because the health care resources these drugs sometimes replace tend to cost less than in the U.S. 
(making the drugs relatively less valuable).  But in our sample, biotech prices were closely 
aligned with relative per capita GDP in Australia, Germany, and the U.K., and remarkably, were 
far above that benchmark in Canada and France, where prices on average exceeded those in the 
U.S.  At the same time, biotech drugs generated less than proportional revenues compared to 
non-biotech drugs.  These circumstances strongly suggest that if the manufacturers charged 
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lower prices for biotech drugs abroad, they would increase both revenues and profits.20  
(Essentially the same reasoning explains why firms normally tend to price most pharmaceuticals 
lower in nations with lower per capita incomes; again, see Danzon and Towse 2003). 
 Some firms seem to pursue a policy of charging a single price in all advanced nations 
(and have said as much; see Columbia Business School 2002 on the cancer drug Gleevec.)  A 
natural question is whether they pursue the profit-maximizing single price across nations.  The 
fact that these five foreign nations accounted for only 13% of the revenues of the biotech drugs 
in our sample seems to suggest that prices are probably close to the profit-maximizing level for 
the U.S.  At any rate, given how small foreign revenues are, we can be reasonably confident that 
biotech drugs were priced well above profit-maximizing levels in foreign nations, and 
presumably far above the prices that those nations would have imposed if they could exercise the 
same controls over biotech prices that they exercise for more traditional drugs. 
 One must ask why manufacturers would avoid charging lower prices abroad even though 
cutting prices would probably increase profits.  We suggest that at least one force, and perhaps 
the primary one, is domestic politics.  Most proposals to control drug prices in the U.S. are keyed 
to prices in Canada and other foreign nations, either indirectly through mass drug importation or 
directly by linking U.S. and foreign prices.  Legislative proposals to permit unrestricted 
importation of drugs from price controlled nations have received strong public and political 
support.  The District of Columbia recently passed a law (later overturned in the courts) to 
directly link domestic drug prices to foreign prices (D.C. 2005), and the state of West Virginia 
has considered similar legislation (West Virginia Cost Pharmaceutical Management Council 
2004).  The National Legislative Association on Prescription Drugs (2005) cites both measures 
in its list of model legislation for state legislatures. 
 Manufacturers presumably take into account the possibility that charging lower prices for 
expensive new drugs in wealthy foreign nations will create pressure for lower prices at home.  
Providing France with a 40% discount for a biotech drug costing $30,000 per treatment, for 
example, seems quite different from charging 40% less for a drug that costs only $70 a month.  
                                                          
20 This conclusion depends on two other factors.  One is the magnitude of marginal costs of manufacturing and 
distribution.  We assume that marginal costs of biotech drugs are well below U.S. prices even though marginal costs 
are typically higher for large-molecule biotech drugs than for small-molecule drugs.  We also assume that physicians 
in the foreign nations are not more reluctant than American physicians to prescribe biotech drugs.  Current debates 
in Canada over lack of access to Herceptin, and in the U.K. over Herceptin, Femara and MabThera (two more 
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Firms may conclude that sacrificing a substantial proportion of foreign profits is a price worth 
paying to forestall price controls in the much larger U.S. market, especially when one considers 
that many biotech drugs are marketed by multi-product firms whose stake in pricing freedom 
extends far beyond a few biotech drugs.  Overall, the effect is that foreign government price 
controls are not the only constraints on pricing.  Domestic politics is also a factor. 
 Why don’t the same political dynamics keep prices of less-unique drugs high?  One 
reason is that international price disparities loom larger for biotech drugs simply because they 
tend to be more expensive than traditional drugs.  Far more important, however, is competition.  
Manufacturers of less-unique drugs presumably cut prices at the insistence of foreign 
governments because they know that if they do not, one of their competitors will cut a deal and 
take away sales.  Even if the manufacturer’s only goal in price negotiations is to deter price 
controls at home, the same competitive forces that reduce profits abroad come into play. 
 
Implications for pharmaceutical research and development 
 In exploring implications for pharmaceutical R&D, we begin with relatively less unique 
drugs.  Almost all the brands in the least-unique and moderately-unique drug categories are 
follow-on drugs (sometimes called “me-too” drugs), i.e., drugs that exploit biological 
mechanisms very similar to those employed in pioneer brands.  With total marginal costs 
typically on the order of 30% of U.S. prices (Danzon 1998, p. 296), the negotiation of foreign 
prices at 40%-50% of U.S. levels leaves a very modest payoff in foreign markets.  The effect is 
to retard the development of follow-on drugs compared to what would occur without price 
controls. 
 This is unfortunate for two reasons.  The most obvious is that most follow-on drugs 
provide substantial benefits to at least some patients in terms of improved side-effect profiles, 
superior efficacy, easier administration, and lower prices through competition (DiMasi and 
Paquette 2004; Lee 2004). 
 Probably more important, however, is the fact that research-based advances in drug 
therapy extend far beyond the discovery of pioneer members of entirely new classes of drugs.  
Essentially, this is because manufacturers of follow-on drugs can gain competitive advantage by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
biotechnology cancer drugs), suggest that physician reluctance is not a strong factor.  Rather, the issue is cost and 
government funds; see Pearson and Rawlins 2005; The Guardian, Aug. 14, 2005; and London Times, Dec. 29, 2005. 
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performing research beyond what is necessary to gain marketing approval.  The results may 
include new indications (such as stroke prevention by the statin class of cholesterol-reducing 
drugs) and broader efficacy (treating patients with lower baseline serum cholesterol levels, for 
example).  Most of what we know about statins, cholesterol, and heart disease, for example, is a 
result of follow-on drug research undertaken for competitive reasons that continues today 
(Langreth 1998; Topol 2004; Nissen, et al. 2006).  The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
(SSRIs) are classified as antidepressants simply because depression happened to be the first of 
several diverse and unexpected applications revealed by follow-on drug research (Holden 2003). 
 The breadth of potential results from follow-on drug research reflects the fact that 
targeted biological mechanisms may play multiple roles in the human body.  Rituximab 
(Rituxan), for example, was initially approved for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a form of cancer, 
but has been approved to treat rheumatoid arthritis.  Etanercept (Enbrel), approved for 
rheumatoid arthritis, is used to treat psoriasis (Leonardi, et al., 2003).  Infliximab (Remicade), 
first used to treat Crohn’s disease, now treats arthritis and ulcerative colitis (Lipsky, et al., 2000; 
Rutgeerts, et al., 2005), while the HIV drug tenofovir (Viread) may be effective against Hepatitis 
B (Benhamou, Tubiana, and Thibault 2003).  Another, more sweeping example is the entire 
NSAID (non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug) class, which was developed to treat arthritis pain.  
Analysis of the biological underpinnings of these drugs suggest they may be useful for 
preventing cancer (Chau and Cunningham 2002) and perhaps other inflammation-related 
conditions such as Alzheimer's and diabetes. Research on these conditions is inherently 
expensive, requiring large, long-term clinical trials.  That research has been funded almost 
entirely by the manufacturers of the Cox-2 inhibitors (Celebrex, Vioxx, etc.) because older 
NSAIDs are all off-patent (Calfee 2005). 
 The consequences of undermining incentives for follow-on drug development are 
comparable to forestalling research on entirely new types of drugs.  An essential point is that 
research findings from follow-on drugs often support broader and more effective usage of older 
drugs, often drugs that are no longer being researched.  Thus the lost benefits of forestalled class-
level research can easily exceed the benefits of the therapeutic advances incorporated in the 
follow-on drugs themselves.  The source of these adverse consequences from lower prices for 
follow-on drugs is the exercise of monopsony power, combined with an inability of 
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manufacturers to communicate with patients about the benefits of competing drugs (as discussed 
below). 
 We turn now to highly unique drugs including most biotech drugs.  Here, prices abroad 
tend to be too high rather than too low, while foreign revenues and usage are unexpectedly and 
even drastically low.  Manufacturers appear to sacrifice profits by maintaining rough parity with 
U.S. prices, presumably out of fear of the political consequences of charging lower prices in 
other wealthy nations.  This is an indirect result of foreign price controls, caused by the threat 
that the U.S. will adopt foreign prices that are controlled at levels far below what free markets 
would generate.  The results are higher-than-expected prices and slower-than-expected uptake of 
new biotech drugs. 
 In other words, the biotech drug prices in our sample appear to be inefficiently high 
rather than, as usually happens with price controls, inefficiently low.  This has several adverse 
effects.  First, many patients who would benefit from these extraordinary drugs are priced out of 
the market (where the “market” is understood to work primarily through government demand 
rather than private demand).  Second, slower uptake of new drugs retards the accumulation of 
valuable information from clinical experience, which in turn can support new or expanded uses 
while also providing new safety information.  Finally, the reluctance of the wealthiest nations 
outside the U.S. to make quicker use of biotech drugs reduces the expected payoffs from 
innovative new drugs and therefore retards research and development.  This adverse effect, like 
the others, is likely to grow.  The political forces at work in the United States are likely to gain 
rather than lose strength.  At the same time, biotechnology-based science will create an ever 
larger share of new drugs, presumably generating similar pricing trends (at least until 
competition among similar biotech drugs leads to lower prices, which may happen fairly soon in 
some therapeutic areas). 
 We emphasize, however, that this is one case in which the undermining of research 
incentives through price disparities does not involve free-riding.  Nations that avoid using 
breakthrough drugs do not reap the benefits of those drugs, at least not in the short run. 
 
A note on direct-to-consumer information from manufacturers 
 One factor in the market for highly innovative drugs, especially biotechnology drugs, can 
easily escape notice.  In the United States, manufacturers can advertise directly to consumers.  
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This tool could enable a manufacturer of a powerful new cancer drug, for example, to appeal 
directly to patients if their health care providers fail to adopt the new drug.  This cannot be done 
in other OECD nations, all of which except New Zealand prohibit direct-to-consumer advertising 
(Hoek, Gendall, and Calfee 2004).  The absence of DTC advertising may be one reason for the 
slow uptake of several very innovative drugs in the nations we studied. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
 In our study of 43 drugs, prescription drug prices in several wealthy nations (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K.) were much lower than in the U.S. on average, well 
below relative per capita GDP.  There was relatively little difference among the five foreign 
nations even after taking into account a 16% government-mandated rebate in Germany.  All this 
is consistent with previous research.  Separating less-unique from more-unique drugs, however, 
revealed important new findings.  Relative prices for less-unique drugs, which are subject to 
strong competition, were at about half the U.S. level.  This presumably reflects the exercise of 
monopsony power that does not exist in the U.S. where buyers as well as sellers compete.  On 
the other hand, relative prices for highly unique drugs tended to be approximately proportional to 
per capita GDP or higher.  Remarkably, biotech drugs were priced at or above U.S. levels in 
Canada and France. 
 These results carry uneasy implications for the future of pharmaceutical research.  
Contrary to what is often assumed, the same follow-on drugs that make therapeutic classes 
competitive also amplify incentives to conduct new R&D within these classes as R&D incentives 
for pioneer brands decline into non-existence with  the approach of patent expiration.  Our results 
suggest that price controls operate to blunt these incentives for follow-on drug research, leaving 
most of the burden to U.S. purchasers.  Because these follow-on R&D results are often extremely 
valuable, the implications merit substantial concern. 
 In contrast, biotech drug prices in foreign nations appear to be above profit-maximizing 
levels, presumably because of political forces in the U.S., while revenues, as one would expect, 
are very low.  This, too, undermines research incentives, mainly in connection with the creation 
of the most innovative kinds of drugs. 
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Appendix 1:  Molecules Analyzed in this Study 
 
All Molecules 
 
Generic Name Brand Name Therapeutic Class 
alendronic acid Fosamax Osteoporosis (biphosphonate) 
amlodipine besylate Norvasc Antihypertensive 
aripiprazole Abilify Antipsychotic 
atorvastatin Lipitor Statin 
azithromycin Zithromax Antibiotic 
celecoxib Celebrex Cox-2 
cetirizine Zyrtec Antihistamine 
citalopram Celexa SSRI/SNRI 
clopidogrel Plavix Anticoagulant 
darbepoetin alfa Aranesp* Anemia 
docetaxel Taxotere Cancer 
donepezil Aricept Alzheimer's 
enoxaparin sodium Lovenox Antithrombotic 
epoetin alfa Epogen* Anemia 
escitalopram oxalate Lexapro SSRI/SNRI 
esomeprazole Nexium Proton Pump Inhibitor 
etanercept Enbrel* RA/anti-TNF 
fexofenadine Allegra Antihistamine 
filgrastim Neupogen* White blood cell prod. 
gabapentin Neurontin Anticonvulsant 
infliximab Remicade* RA/anti-TNF 
lamotrigine Lamictal Anticonvulsant 
lansoprazole Prevacid Proton Pump Inhibitor 
levofloxacin Levaquin Antibiotic 
montelukast Singulair Antihistamine 
olanzapine Zyprexa Antipsychotic 
ondansetron Zofran Anti-nausea 
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Generic Name Brand Name Therapeutic Class 
pantoprazole Protonix Proton Pump Inhibitor 
pegfilgrastim Neulasta* White blood cell prod. 
pioglitazone Actos Type-2 Diabetes 
pravastatin Pravachol Statin 
quetiapine Seroquel Antipsychotic 
rabeprazole Aciphex Proton Pump Inhibitor 
risperidone Risperdal Antipsychotic 
rituximab Rituxan* Cancer 
rosiglitazone Avandia Type-2 Diabetes 
sertraline Zoloft SSRI/SNRI 
sildenafil Viagra ED 
simvastatin Zocor Statin 
sumatriptan Imitrex Triptan (migraines) 
topiramate Topamax Anticonvulsant 
venlafaxine Effexor SSRI/SNRI 
zolpidem Ambien Sedative/hypnotic (insomnia) 
 
* designates a biotechnology drug, according to the Biotechnology Industry Organization 
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Degree of Uniqueness = Zero 
 
Generic Name Brand Name Therapeutic Class 
fexofenadine Allegra Antihistamine 
cetirizine Zyrtec Antihistamine 
amlodipine besylate Norvasc Antihypertensive 
ondansetron Zofran Anti-nausea 
pantoprazole Protonix Proton Pump Inhibitor 
rabeprazole Aciphex Proton Pump Inhibitor 
lansoprazole Prevacid Proton Pump Inhibitor 
esomeprazole Nexium Proton Pump Inhibitor 
simvastatin Zocor Statin 
atorvastatin Lipitor Statin 
pravastatin Pravachol Statin 
sumatriptan Imitrex Triptan (migraines) 
 
Degree of Uniqueness = One 
 
Generic Name Brand Name Therapeutic Class 
montelukast Singulair Antiasthmatic/allergy 
levofloxacin Levaquin Antibiotic (fluoroquinolone) 
azithromycin Zithromax Antibiotic (macrolide) 
enoxaparin sodium Lovenox Anticoagulant 
lamotrigine Lamictal Anticonvulsant 
gabapentin Neurontin Anticonvulsant 
topiramate Topamax Anticonvulsant 
clopidogrel Plavix Antiplatelet 
quetiapine Seroquel Antipsychotic 
risperidone Risperdal Antipsychotic 
olanzapine Zyprexa Antipsychotic 
aripiprazole Abilify Antipsychotic 
zolpidem Ambien Sedative/hypnotic (insomnia) 
sertraline Zoloft SSRI 
venlafaxine Effexor SSRI/SNRI 
escitalopram oxalate Lexapro SSRI 
citalopram Celexa SSRI 
alendronic acid Fosamax Osteoporosis (bisphosphonate) 
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Degree of Uniqueness Two 
 
Generic Name Brand Name Therapeutic Class 
darbepoetin alfa Aranesp* Anemia 
epoetin alfa Epogen* Anemia 
donepezil Aricept Alzheimer's 
docetaxel Taxotere Cancer 
rituximab Rituxan* Cancer 
celecoxib Celebrex Cox-2 
infliximab Remicade* RA/anti-TNF 
etanercept Enbrel* RA/anti-TNF 
pioglitazone Actos Type-2 Diabetes 
rosiglitazone Avandia Type-2 Diabetes 
filgrastim Neupogen* White blood cell prod. 
pegfilgrastim Neulasta* White blood cell prod. 
sildenafil Viagra ED 
 
* designates a biotechnology drug, according to the Biotechnology Industry Organization 
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